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1PROTECTION: Tax Rate, Policy Review
Problem
1. The present tariff rate pattern does not give adequate protection and 
in some cases gives negative protection.
2. In addition the handling of sales tax in respect to some products is 
being done in a way eroding protection even though other ways would be 
in accordance with the Act.
3. The sweeping 1992 removal of import duty on a broad range of products 
intended to encourage domestic production and thus recoup Customs 
losses from Sales Tax gains was not analysed in any detail, was not 
very closely targeted and therefore was subsequently believed to have 
caused a serious net revenue loss.
4. The equally sweeping eatly 1993 reversal of the 1992 tariff removals 
was equally innocent of detailed prior analysis or targeting. As a 
result, while it probably reverses the revenue loss problem of the 
initial Customs abolitions, it - thereby - simply reinstates the lack 
of protection/negative projection problem.
Background
5. To understand what has happened requires going back to the last full 
scale, overall tariff reform — 1980:
a. at that time protection did not need fiscal measures because of 
import controls which de facto meant if a local manufacturer could 
produce a plausible product at a plausible price no import licence 
was likely to be issued;
b. since 1972-74 (last previous overall reform) a host of different 
rates had proliferated for fiscal, protection and other reasons. 
Each may (when adopted) have made sense taken by itself, but the 
complicated set of rates as a whole had become unsound 
administratively and the protection rates no longer made sense;
c. as a result four basic rates were adopted: 0%, 25%, 50% 150% plus a 
few special ones in respect to petroleum, alcohol and tobacco
2products and automobiles (a handleable number of exceptions, each 
of which — arguably — poses special problems of unification). 0% 
was for basic food, pharmaceuticals and a few other goods. 25% was 
a standard and 50% an amenity revenue rate. 150% was to be semi- 
preventative (and was largely on goods quite unlikely to secure 
import licenses).
6. After 1980 (inevitably) rates proliferated - up, down, sideways. Some 
high rates were adopted for revenue purposes and then reduced under 
Bank/Fund pressure. In addition, a number of particular rates were 
adopted for reasons by now obscure to everybody. The result - once 
again — is a messy structure whose interaction has not been checked 
systematically.
7. In addition, from 1984 (own funds imports) and especially 1988 (moves 
toward OGL and import support sold for almost any imports with only a 
short negative list) fiscal (tax) protection has again become a live 
issue.
Protection
8. The results (apart from administrative/assessment complications) 
include quite unintended results on protection:
a. too low or negative - usually heard about because producers 
complain;
b. too high - which are not found out unless there is a study.




10. Crown corks apparently have a higher tariff on one or more of their 
imported components than on the finished product. In addition, the 
same applies to sales tax. (This is not necessarily so silly — in 
principle — as it sounds. If one or more of imported items is also a 
final product or an input into amenity consumer goods whereas crown
3corks are seen - correctly - as an input into manufacturing with the 
basic tax that on the final consumer product then the logic is correct 
except that it overlooks the negative protection problem.)
11. In respect to Customs the rates need to be checked. If the imports are 
metal blanks and cork sheet both should be at lowest standard rate as 
neither has a direct consumption use.
12. In respect to Sales Tax something appears to have gone wrong 
procedurally. If crown corks pay ST (as they do) the major import 
components (cork, metal blanks) should go to the manufacturer "in bond" 
under a "registered dealer/user certificate" and not be taxed so long 
as used in the (taxed) crown corks. That is both provided for in the 
ST Act procedures and integral in the logic of a single stage (not a 
cascade) ST.
13. Bicycles pose a different problem. As I understand it there are two 
customs heads: bicycles and parts for bicycles. Both are at the same 
customs and ST rates. (In this case the ST issue was not raised to me 
so possibly National Bicycle do have "registered dealer" status which 
they certainly should.)
14. Parts should be at the same rate as bicycles because they are a final 
consumer good. That, however, does not resolve National Bicycle's 
problem. One way would be to create a new category:
"Bicycles - Wholly or substantially complete knocked down 
kits imported by licensed assemblers"
Logically 0% on Customs and on Sales Tax on importation.
15. The sub-category is 'safe' because there is now only one assembler.
The Minister can give orders "under his hand" published in Gazette. If 
another genuine assembler, it can be licensed too. There never will be 
so many that processing licence applications will be time consuming.
16. Garments pose a yet different problem. Imported garments have a high 
tariff - against imports of new foreign garments competently made local 
ones are competitive. The difficulty is used clothes.
17. Because rich country users discard basically sound clothing when out of 
style or needing simple repairs and the domestic repair cost is
4high/resale market low, used clothes of reasonable quality are cheaper 
than any maker of new clothes' costs. This is especially true of 
jackets and trousers.
18. What to do is not clear. Poor Tanzanians do benefit from cheaper
products. The garment industry is hampered. Simple ad valorem tariffs
are not likely to be effective - the cost c.i.f. of a Bports jacket may 
well be as low as Sh 1,000 and of a pair of slacks Sh 500. Even 50% to 
75% duty does not help much to even prices.
19. The resale by charities issue is peripheral. Resale when duty waived
should be banned. But so long as imports of the products are not
banned a charity should be able to import/pay tax/sell (to poor 
people/to raise money for other programmes.
20. An across the board ban would protect. But it would also raise cost - 
especially of jackets/trousers to poor Tanzanians.
21. A possible structure taking account of what our garment industry 
actually produces moderately efficiently would be:
a. Jackets - 50% but not less than
Sh 750
b. Trousers - 50% but not less than
Sh 1000
c. Coats - 50% but not less than
Sh 1000
d. Other - 100% but not less than
Sh 1000
This would not greatly impede jacket or coat imports (no serious 
domestic production). It should protect any efficient-medium price 
trouser producer. It would probably cause drastic drop in used shirt/T 
shirt imports. The specific alternative is put because there is an 
inherent problem in valuation.
5How to Proceed
22. The three products cited all pose special issues and require different 
approaches. The issues/approaches relate to:
a. industry structures/capacities
b. consumer welfare considerations
c. general economic policy goals and also
d. structures not creating major administration/evasion problems for 
Hazina
It is doubtful a case by case approach along these lines would lead to 
substantial revenue losses (or gains) including:
a. customs + sales tax on entry and
b. sales tax on producers + company tax on their profits.
23. But there are probably 100 cases to be checked. That takes time - as
well as industrial expertise. The Treasury does not have the economist 
numbers to do it nor are its economists specialists on manufacturing.
24. Therefore a practicable approach would be an Inter-ministerial Working 
Party (or Task Force or Review Group) to include:
A. Finance (Economist + Deputy Commissioner Revenue for Indirect 
Taxes)
B. Commerce and Industry (Economists)
C. Planning (Deputy Secretary Policy plus Industrial Planner).
As a 'neutral1 party concerned with overall policy Planning could well 
convene meetings and compile agreed report to the three Ministers.
25. The issue is of some urgency because certain firms - e.g. National 
Bicycle - might need to shut down if no action. But there is no 
deadline - this is not primarily a revenue measure so need not be in 
Budget Bills package. However, more urgent cases could usefully be 
dealt with by then for inclusion in 1993/94 Budget measures.
6Post Script
26. The foregoing deals with protection. There may be a broader case for 
simplification to reduce rates to 3 to 5:
a. 0%
b. 20% most raw materials, intermediate goods, capital goods
c. 50% amenity consumer goods
d. 100% luxury consumer goods (including video equipment and
videos, brandy, saloon cars, extended cab pick-ups, etc.)
27. Such a review would logically parallel an ST review because for revenue
what matters is combined rate not ST or Customs alone. (That exercise 
could also reverse the misguided separation of Excise from Customs.) 
Again a 3 to 5 rate pattern should be adequate but perhaps alcohol, 
tobacco, petroleum products, saloon cars/extended body pick-ups would 
need special rates. This is not inevitable, each can be ad valorem if 
desired and automobiles can be either high ST or high initial 
registration (no evident logic in having both but because registration 
is needed for other reasons no great cost in having two bites at the 
tax cherry).
28. That exercise is partly general economic policy and partly revenues so
probably best chaired by Finance (Deputy Secretary Policy plus
Commissioner for Indirect Tax) assisted by Planning (Deputy Secretary 
Policy). Probably too late for 1993/4 Budget so could begin August to 
conclude by November as input into 1994/95 Budgetary Cycle.
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